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I. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
The Assembly of Colonial North Carolina enactedl legislation to
protect certain personal property from claims" of creditors and on
numerous occasions2 prior to 1868 the General Assembly increased the
statutory list of exempt articles.
The policy of exempting real property was initiated in Texas and
spread rapidly to other states. In 1867, the General Assembly of
North Carolina passed its first homestead law.4 Citizens of the state
owning a freehold within the state were permitted to claim a homestead
(i.e., land not subject to be sold under execution) not exceeding 'one
hundred acres in the country or one acre in city or town. This
statute was short-lived for it, together with the personal property ex-
emption laws, was superseded by provisions in the Constitution of
1868.5
The framers of the Constitution of 1868, in providing for exemp-
tions of both real and personal property from sale under execution,
departed from the prior practice of exempting specific acres of land
or specified items of personal property and provided for exemptions
based on monetary value. Personal property not exceeding $500.00
and real property not exceeding $1,000.007 were made exempt by the
Constitution and these amounts remain unchanged today.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina considered the homestead law
an enlargement of the purposes manifested in the earlier laws providing
* See generally Haskins, Homestead Exemptions, 63 HARv. L. REv. 1289
(1950); Notes, 97 U. PA. L. REv. 677 (1949); 46 YALE L. J. 1023 (1937);
Vance, Homestead Exemption Laws, 7 ENcYc. Soc. ScIENcEs 441 (1932);
Crosby and Miller, Our Legal Chameleon, the Florida Homestead Exemption, 2
FLA. L. REv. 12, 219, 346 (1949); Note, The Illinois Homestead Exemption,
1950 ILL. L. FORUM 99.
** Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
t Revisal of the Acts of the Assembly of North Carolina, 1773, p. 538.
'McINTosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACrIcE AND PROCEDURE 875 n. 88 (1929).
" Vance, Homestead Exemption Laws, 7 ENcYC. Soc. SCIENCES 441 (1932).
'Laws of N. C. (1866-67) c. 61; Earle v. Hardie, 80 N. C. 177 (1879).
'N. C. CONsT. Art. X §2, "Every homestead, and the dwellings and buildings
used therewith, not exceeding in value one thousand dollars, to be selected by
the owner thereof, or in lieu thereof, at the option of the owner, any lot in a
city, town or village with the dwelling and buildings used thereon, owned and
occupied by any resident of this State, and not exceeding the value of one thousand
dollars, shall be exempt from sale under execution or other final process obtained
on any debt ......
' N. C. CONsT. Art. X §1. T N. C. ConsT. Art. X §2.
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personal property exemptions. 8 In addition to protecting the "house-
keeper" or his family from being deprived of immediate needs of food
and clothing,9 it was the wish of the government "to see every man with
a home for his wife and children." This was to be accomplished by
permitting a certain part of the real property of a debtor to be set apart
for his use and occupation "where he might dwell with his family in
peace and contentment without any creditors to molest or make him
afraid...."10
Homestead is a right secured by the Constitution and vests inde-
pendent of legislation." However, supplementary legislation was needed
to implement the constitutional provisions and it was promptly sup-
plied.' 2 Apart from this legislation, there arose questions concerning
the power of the General Assembly to increase or diminish the home-
stead provisions of the Constitution. In Martin v. Hughes,18 decided
in 1872, it was stated that the General Assembly could not reduce what
the Constitution provides but the court indicated there was nothing to
forbid exemption of a larger homestead. In 1877 the General Assembly
undertook to increase the duration of homestead beyond the period
specified in the Constitution.'4 The following year Justice Bynum
speaking for the court commented:
"Exemption laws, without diminishing the need of credit, have
naturally made credit more precarious and insecure, and as a re-
sult have proportionately increased the premium which must be'
paid for it; so that at few periods in our history has interest been
higher and borrowed money less remunerative than now .... 1
This attitude may have influenced the court to set aside its dictum in
Martin v. Hugh&s and specifically to overrule the Act of 1877. The
court in 1883 declared that it was beyond the power of the legislature to
enlarge constitutional provisions for personal property and homestead
exemptions. 16
II. NATURE AND CHARACTER
No precise definition of homestead appears in the Constitution; and
the courts have been required to undertake this responsibility. Since
homestead was not a common law development little, if any, assistance
8 Citizens National Bank v. Green, 78 N. C. 247 (1878).
'Dean v. King, 35 N. C. 20 (1851).
0" Jacobs v. Smallwood, 63 N. C. 112, 116 (1869). For somewhat similar
recent statement see Williams v. Johnson, 230 N. C. 338, 343, 53 S. E. 2d 277,
281 (1949).11Adrian v. Shaw, 82 N. C. 474 (1880).
Now N. C. GEar. STAT §§1-369 through 1-392 (1943).
13 67 N. C. 293 (1872).
14 Laws of N. C. (1876-77) c. 253.
15 Citizens National Bank v. Green, 78 N. C. 247 (1878).
10Wharton v. Taylor. 88 N. C. 230 (1883).
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could be derived from that source.17 Moreover, because of important
variations in the laws of other states, the North Carolina Court has
been hesitant to look to them for guidance.'
8
Efforts to find a suitable definition for homestead have been unsuc-
cessful. At various times it has been referred to as a "determinable
fee,"'19 a "mere determinable exemption, '20 a "quality annexed to the
land,"2' 1 a "quality of exemption to an existing estate"22 and a "mere
exemption right."23  Recently, the North Carolina Court has simply
used the language of the Constitution and said that homestead was a
mere exemption from sale under execution or like process.
24
Justice Brown was prompted to say that the efforts of the court to
define homestead revealed "much confusion of the judicial mind.
'25 It
was eventually agreed by the North Carolina Court that homestead was
not an interest or estate in land.2 6  Whatever the nature of the estate
held by the debtor, it remains unchanged when homestead is allotted.
Hence, there is no reversionary interest for the creditors to sell during
the existence of the homestead2 7 and the debtor's full interest in the ex-
empt land is protected. From this standpoint the law is consistent with
the idea that homestead is not an interest or estate in land. Yet, the judg-
ment creditor may require reasonable use be made of the land leaving
it substantially as it was when the exemption began except for ordinary
depreciation. 28  Furthermore, the debtor may dispose of the reversion
himself by conveying his land but expressly reserving homestead
therein.29  This is illustrative of many situations where homestead has
varying characteristics and for this reason precise definition is imprac-
ticable. It is essential to examine the various situations in which home-
stead operates for an understanding of its nature and character.
" Justice Burwell stated in Vanstory v. Thornton, 112 N. C. 197, 210, 17 S. E.
566, 569 (1893): "It may be that inadvertent expressions have been used in the
effort to adapt the nomenclature of the common law to a matter unknown to that
system of jurisprudence." Compare the following statement of Dean Mordecai:
"It will be observed that this homestead law is a return, to a certain extent, to
the original common law and feudal ideas of exempting lands from subjection
to debt and other liabilities." II MoRDEcAf's LAW LECTURES 1029 (2d ed. 1916).
18 Hager v. Nixon, 69 N. C. 108 (1873).
1 Poe v. Hardie, 65 N. C. 447 (1871).
Citizens National Bank v. Green, 78 N. C. 247 (1878).51Gheen v. Summey, 80 N. C. 187 (1879).
"Markham v. Hicks, 90 N. C. 204 (1884).
"Fulp v. Brown, 153 N. C. 531, 69 S. E. 612 (1910)."Sample v. Jackson, 225 N. C. 380, 35 S. E. 2d 236 (1945).
"Kirkwood v. Peden, 173 N. C. 460, 92 S. E. 264 (1917).
"Ibid.
" Markham v. Hicks, 90 N. C. 204 (1884). At one time it was a misdemeanor
to sell the reversionary interest under execution. Laws of N. C. (1869-70) c. 121."Jones v. Britton, 102 N. C. 166, 9 S. E. 554 (1889).
"Hicks v. Wooten, 175 N. C. 597, 96 S. E. 107 (1918); Hinsdale v. Wit-
liams, 75 N. C. 430 (1876).
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III. ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS
A. Persons Entitled.
Any resident of North Carolina owning and occupying land in this
state is entitled to homestead for the duration of his life. Such person
may be a man or woman,30 single3 1 or married,3 2 rich 3 or poor. Under
some circumstances (discussed infraP4 ) a widow may enjoy the home-
stead of her husband but he is not entitled to succeed to hers. Minor
children succeed to the homestead of their father to the exclusion of
his widow.3 5 No provision has been made for a minor child to take
over the homestead which their mother held in her own right at her
death.
Since the adoption of the Uniform Partnership Act3 6 in 1941 a part-
ner is no longer entitled to claim homestead in the partnership property,
although before this legislation, he was permitted to do so with the
consent of the other partners.3 7 A corporation cannot claim home-
stead.38 A bankrupt does not lose his homestead rights but is entitled
to the exemptions provided by state law3" and title to exempt property
remains in the bankrupt and is not vested in the trustee in bankruptcy.
40
B. Residency.
Homestead in North Carolina is available only to residents of this
state41 and it terminates upon the owner's removal from the state.42 If a
father or husband leaves this state and makes his home elsewhere his
wife or children are not entitled to succeed to his homestead even though
they remain.43 It is sometimes difficult to determine what constitutes
a loss of residency within the meaning of the homestead laws. A resi-
30 N. C. CONST. Art X §2 says "owner." Bailey v. Barron, 112 N. C. 54, 16
S. E. 910 (1893) ; Flaum v. Wallace, 103 N. C. 296, 9 S. E. 567 (1889).
3' Gardner v. Betts, 114 N. C. 496, 19 S. E. 794 (1894) (single man).
32 Smith v. Eakes, 212 N. C. 382, 193 S. E. 393 (1937) ; Equitable Life Assur-
ance Society v. Russos, 210 N. C. 121, 185 S. E. 632 (1936) (married women).
"' "While the homestead may have real beneficial value only when the owner
is in debt and pressed by final process of the court, it is ever operative. A resi-
dent occupant of real property, though free from debt and possessed of great
wealth, may, if he so elects, have it set apart to him on his own voluntary peti-
tion." Williams v. Johnson, 230 N. C. 338, 342, 53 S. E. 2d 277, 280 (1949).
*' See section IV B. infra.
'5 See section IV A. infra.
30 N. C. GEx. STAT. §59-55(2)(c) (1943).
3 Davis v. Smith, 113 N. C. 94, 18 S. E. 53 (1893) ; McMillan v. Williams,
109 N. C. 252, 13 S. E. 764 (1891).
38 Sugg v. Pollars, 184 N. C. 494, 115 S. E. 153 (1922).
"30 STAT. 548 (1898), 11 U. S. C. §24 (1946) ; Sample v. Jackson, 226 N. C.
408, 38 S. E. 2d 155 (1946); Simpson v. Houston, 97 N. C. 344, 2 S. E. 651
(1887); Windley v. Tankard, 88 N. C. 223 (1883).
"030 STAT. 565 (1898), as amended, 11 U. S. C. §110(a) (1946); Watters v.
Hedgpeth, 172 N. C. 310, 90 S. E. 314 (1916).
"l N. C. CoNsT. Art. X §2. The same is true for personal property exemption.
N. C. CoxsT. Art. X §1.
"' Scott & Company v. Jones, 230 N. C. 74. 52 S. E. 2d 219 (1949).
"3 Finley v. Saunders, 98 N. C. 462, 4 S. E. 516 (1887).
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dent who moved to South Carolina for two years but intended to return
to this state was held to have lost his homestead exemption"4 but a con-
trary result 45 was reached where the resident went to Georgia for the
winter months for the purpose of trading. In Chitty v. Chitty4" the
court upheld the right of homestead of a person who left the state to
avoid arrest but refused47 to go so far when the absence was to avoid
the serving of a criminal sentence. Orice residency has been established
it is presumed to continue .and the burden of proving a change is upon
the person who relies on such a change.48
C. Ownership.
Homestead has not been confined to owners of the fee simple interest
but has been given to owners of a life estate.4 9 It is not certain whether
the owner of an estate for years would be so entitled. Technical dis-
tinctions between freehold and non-freehold estates could be used to
preclude the owner of an estate for years from enjoying homestead.50
Otherwise, there would seem to be no objection to permitting home-
stead in an estate for years. There is nothing in the Constitution5 1 or
the decisions to prevent it; in fact, the North Carolina Court has
intimated that homestead in such an estate might be recognized.
52
D. Occupancy.
In addition to the requirements of residency and ownership it is
specified in the Constitution that the land be occupied.m Occupancy,
however, does not require the owner to reside actually on the property.
One may occupy a plot of land by cultivating it or continuously pro-
curing timber from it.54 The test, according to Justice Ruffin, is that
".... there can be no homestead without a home or the immediate possi-
bility of a home upon the land itself." 55 Under this test, the owner of
" Lee v. Moseley, 101 N. C. 311, 7 S. E: 874 (1888).
"Fulton v. Roberts, 113 N. C. 422, 18 S. E. 510 (1893)."8118 N. C. 647, 24 S. E. 517 (1896).
" Cromer v. Self, 149 N. C. 164, 62 S. E. 885 (1908). It was apparent that
the court did not fully approve of the decision in Chitty v. Chitty but it preferred
to distinguish rather than overrule.
"Ferguson v. Wright, 113 N. C. 537, 18 S. E. 691 (1893).
"' Virginia-Carolina Chemical Corporation v. Stuart, 200 N. C. 490, 157 S. E.
608 (1931) ; accord, Murchison v. Plyler, 87 N. C. 79 (1882).
" For many purposes an estate for years is treated as personal property in
North Carolina. Note, 25 N. C. L. REv. 516 (1947) ; I MORSEcAf's LAW LECrURES
529 (2d ed. 1916).
"' The Hgmestead Statute of 1867 used the word "freehold" but the language
of the Constitution is not so confined.
" Burton v. Spiers, 87 N. C. 87, 94 (1882) ; Markham v. Hicks, 90 N. C. 204
(1884).
' N. C_ CoNsr. Art. X §2.
Martin v. Hughes, 67 N. C. 293 (1873).
"Murchison v. Plyler, 87 N. C. 79, 81 (1882).
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a remainder subject to a life estate is not entitled to homestead.50
Moreover, the court has indicated that two separate homesteads could
not exist in the same land at the same time.57 On the other hand,
should the particular estate be determined before the judgment creditor
exercises his right to sell, the owner of the remainder may then claim
homestead.58  This result may be reached by the remainderman secur-
ing the release of the life estate after a judgment is docketed but before
execution.59
E. In What Land.
Is homestead restricted to owners of land who have a dwelling
thereon? The first legislative enactment after the adoption of the
Constitution of 1868 contained language, subsequently deleted, to the
effect that homestead should apply to real estate which "may be occupied
by the owner as an actual homestead."60 The Supreme Court of North
Carolina on several occasions 61 has stated that the framers of the Con-
stitution supposed that the debtor would take his homestead in the
dwelling which he inhabited. When confronted with the question of
granting homestead to a person who owned land but no dwelling, the
court did not hesitate in giving an affirmative answer on the ground that
to hold otherwise would exclude the poorest and most needy. 2 There-
fore, one who owns only vacant lots63 or timber land0 4 is entitled to
homestead.
The General Assembly in 1868, anticipating that situations would
arise where the value of the dwelling and continguous land would be
less than $1,000.00, provided in such cases for homestead to exist in
different tracts not continguous.6 5
Although there is some doubt that the owner of a dwelling worth
$1,000.00 or more in which he resides with his family, has an absolute
choice to select homestead in other land ;66 nevertheless, the North Caro-
lina Court has found it desirable to avoid a rigid rule making it manda-
tory for homestead to include the dwelling.67 On two occasions when
"Stern v. Lee, 115 N. C. 426, 20 S. E. 736 (1894) ; Murchison v. Plyler, 87
N. C. 79 (1882).
"'Murchison v. Plyler, 87 N. C. 79 (1882).
"' Stern v. Lee, 115 N. C. 426, 20 S. E. 736 (1894).
5 Wright v. Bond, 127 N. C. 39, 37 S. E. 65 (1900)."Pub. Laws of N. C. (1868-69) c. 137 §1.
"l Flora v. Robbins, 93 N. C. 38 (1885); Mayho v. Cotton, 69 N. C. 289
(1873) ; Watts v. Leggett, 66 N. C. 197 (1872)."2 Allen v. Shields, 72 N. C. 504 (1875).
" Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Russos, 210 N. C. 121, 185 S. E. 632
(1936).6 4Jones v. Britton, 102 N. C. 166, 9 S. E. 554 (1889).
N. C. GEN. STAT. §1L377 (1943).
"'Allen v. Shields, 72 N. C. 504 (1875). Cf. Gregory v. Ellis. 86 N. C. 579
(1882).6 Mayho v. Cotton, 69 N. C. 289 (1873).
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a debtor conveyed his dwelling in fraud of creditors and accepted home-
stead in other land, he was not permitted to claim homestead in the
dwelling after the conveyance had been set aside.6 8 And it made no
difference that the value of the "other land" did not amount to
$1,000.00.63 In Flora v. Robbins70 the owner had mortgaged his dwell-
ing for its full value but he held other land which was unincumbered.
The court concluded that in this situation it would be in the spirit if
not the letter of the Constitution for the debtor to have his homestead
allotted in the unincumbered land.
F. Honwstead in Money?
In Oakley v. Van Noppen7 ' the judgment creditor desired to sell
the whole house of the debtor and to permit $1,000.00 of the sale price
to be used by the debtor as homestead. The court rejected this plan
and adhered 72 to its previously expressed view that the debtor was en-
titled to a specific and defined part of the property as homestead.
Circumstances have arisen which leave no choice but to provide that
the debtor take his homestead in money. Most often this occurs when
there is a surplus after a mortgage foreclosures or homestead is allowed
in the proceeds from a sale for partition 7 4 The difficult question in these
situations is to determine the manner in which the debtor is to enjoy
homestead. Earlier cases75 suggested the possibility of giving the debtor
the present cash value of homestead based on the tables of expectancy.
In Farris v. Hendricks76 the court was squarely faced with this question
and rejected payment of present cash value on the ground that it would,
in many cases, greatly impair the judgment lien. Instead, the debtor
was permitted to enjoy the rents and profits in the form of interest. A
similar result was reached in Smith v. Eakes7 7 where the court per-
mitted the debtor to receive the "net income" from homestead money
which was allowed in the proceeds from a sale for partition until the
termination of her homestead rights. Another possible solution in some
of these exceptional cases would be for the court to permit the debtor
to invest the surplus not exceeding the value of homestead in real
property.
68 Whitehead v. Spivey, 103 N. C. 66, 9 S. E. 319 (1899) ; Spoon v. Reid, 78
N. C. 244 (1878).09Whitehead v. Spivey, 103 N. C. 66, 9 S. E. 319 (1899).
70193 N. C. 38 (1885).
7196 N. C. 247, 2 S. E. 663 (1887).
7, Campbell v. White, 95 N. C. 491 (1886).
7" Miller v. Little, 212 N. C. 612, 194 S. E. 92 (1937); Farris v. Hendricks,
196 N. C. 439, 146 S. E. 77 (1928); Leak v. Gay, 107 N. C. 468, 12 S. E. 251
(1890).
7' Smith v. Eakes, 212 N. C. 382, 193 S. E. 393 (1937).
71Leak v. Gay, 107 N. C. 468, 12 S. E. 251 (1890); Wilson v. Patton, 87
N. C. 319 (1882).
78196 N. C. 439, 146 S. E. 77 (1928).
" 212 N. C. 382, 193 S. E. 393 (1937).
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IV. RIGHTS OF THE WIDOW AND CHILDREN OF A Hom_.TEAE
A. Children.
Children 78 of a deceased debtor will succeed to his homestead whether
allotted before or after his death 9 to the exclusion of his widow if two
conditions are present: (1) their deceased father must have left cred-
itors ;80 (2) the child or children must be under twenty-one years of
age at the death of their father.8 ' Minor children alone are entitled to
the homestead and it is not shared by adult children.82 The doctrine
of survivorship prevails and if a minor dies or arrives at full age, the
whole homestead survives and accrues to his brothers and sisters who
are under age.P No inquiry is made into the financial condition of
the minors84 and where minor children had inherited land from their
mother, it was held85 they were entitled to homestead in preference to
their stepmother. When the youngest minor reaches his majority the
homestead terminates and does not go to the widow of the deceased
homesteader88
B. Widow.
In order for a widow87 to succeed to the homestead of her husband
three prerequisites must be satisfied: (1) the widow must not own a
homestead in her own right, s (2) her husband must have left cred-
itors89 (her homsetead rights are not divested by payment of the
creditors by the heirs at law of the deceased) ;90 (3) there must be no
children minor or adult of the deceased husband surviving him.9' This
1 N. C. CoNsT. Art. X §3: "The homestead, after the death of the owner
thereof, shall be exempt from the payment of any debt during the minority of his
children, or any of them."
7 N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-389 (1943).80 Hager v. Nixon, 69 N. C. 108 (1873).
BIN. C. CoNsT. Art. X §3; Saylor v. Powell, 90 N. C. 202 (1884).
' Simpson v. Wallace, 83 N. C. 477 (1880).
BaId. at 481.
"Allen v. Shields, 72 N. C. 504 (1875).
Spence v. Goodwin, 128 N. C. 273, 38 S. E. 859 (1901).
Barnes v. Cherry, 190 N. C. 772, 130 S. E. 611 (1925). General statements
such as those in Jones v. Britton, 102 N. C. 166, 168 (1889) are susceptible to a
contrary construction.
87 N. C. CoNsT. Art. X §5: "If the owner of a homestead die, leaving a widow
but no children, the same shall be exempt from the debts of her husband, and the
rents and profits thereof shall inure to her benefit during her widowhood, unless
she be the owner of a homestead in her own right."
" N. C. CoNsT. Art. X §5; Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Russos, 210
N. C. 121, 185 S. E. 632 (1936) ; Bailey v. Barron, 112 N. C. 54, 16 S. E. 910
(1893). (Cases discuss the right of a married woman to her own homestead.)
"Caudle v. Morris, 160 N. C. 168, 76 S. E. 17 (1912) ; Hager v. Nixon, 69
N. C. 108 (1873). A widow is never entitled to her husband's personal property
exemption. Smith v. McDonald, 95 N. C. 163 (1886).
" Tucker v. Tucker, 103 N. C. 170, 9 S. E. 299 (1889).
"Barnes v. Cherry, 190 N. C. 772, 130 S. E. 611 (1925); Williams v. Whit-
aker, 110 N. C. 393, 14 S. E. 924 (1892); Wharton v. Leggett, 80 N. C. 169
(1879); N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-389 (1943).
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latter point is emphasized in Simmons v. Respass.92  The debtor was
survived by two adult children by his first wife and also by his widow
by a second marriage. The widow was not entitled to homestead be-
cause her husband was survived by his children.
If these three requirements are met, the widow may succeed to her
husband's homestead whether allotted before or after his death and she
is entitled to enjoy the rents and profits. The homestead terminates if
she remarries 93 but otherwise will last during her life.
V. EFFECT OF HOMESTEAD ON CREDITOR's CLAIM
judgment creditors do not lose their liens against the debtor's home-
stead but are prevented from enforcing them as long as the land re-
tains the character of homestead. Since this usually lasts for the life
of the debtor and in some cases for an additional time either for the
minority of his children or the life of his widow, the creditor must have
protection from the statute of limitations.
A. Statute of Limitations.
Since 1869,9 with the exception of a two year period, 5 there has
been a legislative provision suspending the running of the statute of
limitations on all judgments against the homesteader during the con-
tinuance of the homestead.96 The effect of this provision is to suspend
the judgment as a lien on the homestead property only; it does not toll
the statute in respect to the debt as such or the personal liability of the
debtor.97 The statute will not be suspended if the homestead is not
allotted within ten years after the judgment is docketed 8 and the same
is true if the allotment made is determined to be invalid.99 Payment
of a particular judgment under which a debtor's homestead is allotted
will not extinguish the homestead and revive the running of the statute
against other judgments then of record or thereafter docketed. 100
" 151 N. C. 5, 65 S. E. 516 (1909).
" "Always bear in mind when about to marry a widow, that she loses her
homestead in her former husband's estate as soon as she marries you. The widow
will be on your hands and both of you will be off of your predecessor's lands.
She may at times reflect on the question as to which is to be preferred, you that
she has gained or the homestead that she has lost." I MoRDEcAfs LAW LECTURES
607 (2d ed. 1916).
'Laws of N. C. (1869-70) c. 121.
"11883-1885 (apparently inadvertedly omitted by the Code Commissioners).
"IN. C. GEx. STAT. §1-369 (1943).
"7 Williams v. Johnson, 230 N. C. 338, 53 S. E. 2d 277 (1949): "A money
judgment is a bipronged, dual-natured instrument: (1) It is the evidence of a
personal debt of the judgment debtor payable out of any assets he may possess,
and (2) it is a lien against the real estate of the debtor as security for the
payment of the debt.' Id. at 344.
"Wilson v. Beaufort County Lumber Company, 131 N. C. 163, 42 S. E. 565
(1902); N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-369 . . . "the allotment [italics supplied] of the
homestead shall . . . suspend. . . ." Compare Act of 1885 and the construction
given it in Farrar v. Harper, 133 N. C. 71, 45 S. E. 510 (1903).
" Sansom v. Johnson, 212 N. C. 383, 193 S. E. 272 (1937).
10 Williams v. Johnson, 230 N. C. 338, 53 S. E. 2d 277 (1949).
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B. Effect of a Conveyance of Homestead on the Statute of Limitations.
In Bevan v. Ellis'0 ' it was held that a conyevance of homestead
property did not revive the running of the statute. But this was over-
ruled by the Act of 1905102 which provides that a conveyance of home-
stead terminates the exemption and it has the effect 0 3 of reviving the
running of the statute on the conveyed property. Mere execution of a
mortgage on the homestead property is not such a conveyance within
the meaning of the statute.'
04
C. Claims Superior to Homestead.
Homestead is not 0 5 exempt from sale under execution (1) for debts
contracted prior to the adoption of the constitution; (2) for obligations
contracted for the purchase of the premises; (3) for laborer's and
mechanic's liens; (4) for taxes. Initially, it was held 0 0 by the North
Carolina Court that homestead was effective against debts incurred prior
to the adoption of the Constitution of 1868, but in Edwards v. Kear-
sey10 7 the Supreme Court of the United States reversed this view on
the ground that the application to such debts constitutes an impairment
of the obligation of contracts.
(1) Purchase Money Obligations.
Article X, section 2 of the Constitution provides that no property
shall be exempt from sale 'for payment of obligations contracted for
the purchase of the premises. This provision does not have the effect
of giving the vendor of real estate a lien for purchase money. The
vendor is required to reduce his claim to judgment and at that timed it
becomes a lien as any other docketed judgment;108 then where it is
shown that the obligation was for purchase money, the judgment debtor
is precluded from claiming homestead in this land.""
In Brodie v. Batchelor" it was held that a loan of money to the
vendee to purchase certain land-which was done-did not subrogate
the lender to the rights of the vendor, who had been paid, and the debt
was not an obligation for purchase money. A contrary result was
101 121 N. C. 224, 28 S. E. 471 (1897); Brown v. Harding, 171 N. C. 686,
690, 89 S. E. 222, 224 (1916).
102 N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-370 (1943).
108 Crouch v. Crouch, 160 N. C. 447, 449, 76 S. E. 482, 483 (1912).
101 Cleve v. Adams. 222 N. C. 211, 22 S. E. 2d 567 (1942).
10 Bynum v. Miller, 89 N. C. 393 (1883).
108 Hill v. Kessler, 63 N. C. 437 (1869) ; Barrett v. Richardson, 76 N. C. 429
(1877).0T Smith v. High, 85 N. C. 93 (1881).
108 Hardy v. Carr, 104 N. C. 33, 10 S. E. 128 (1889).
"0'Billings v. Joines, 151 N. C. 363, 66 S. E. 307 (1909) ; Durham v. Bostic,
72 N. C. 353 (1874); Jarrett v. Holland, 213 N. C. 428, 431, 196 S. E. 314, 316
(1938).
11-075 N. C. 51 (1876).
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reached where the lender, in effect, paid the vendor directly.'1 1 The
theory adopted by the court was the original indebtedness was not dis-
charged but merely assigned to the lender. A vendee was not allowed
homestead when the judgment against him was obtained on notes which
he had transferred to the vendor by endorsement for purchase money"12
and the same result was reached where the vendee agreed, in paying for
the land, to take up a note on which the vendor was bound but failed
to do so."
3
(2) Mechanic's and Laborer's Liens.
A laborer's or mechanic's lien is by constitutional provision superior
to homestead." 4 A laborer's lien is distinguished from the mechanic's
lien in that the former is solely for labor performed whereas the latter
is broader and includes the building built" 5 (i.e., labor and material).
Thus, where the work done and the material furnished on a house were
all in the same contract the contractor was entitled to a mechanic's lien
for the whole amount."
6
In 1869 the General Assembly in addition to making provision for
laborer's and mechanic's liens also made it possible for those who furnish
only material to have a lien." 7  In Cummings v. Bloodworth"8 it was
held that a materialmen's lien being merely statutory was not superior
to homestead because the latter was created by the Constitution.
(3) Taxation.
All property is subject to taxation unless an exemption is provided
by law."19 Homestead property is not exempt and the Constitution
specifically provides that the homestead may be sold to satisfy an obli-
gation for taxes due on the land.12° However, in 1936, Article V section
111 Lawson v. Pringle, 98 N. C. 450, 4 S. E. 188 (1887).
112 Whitaker v. Elliott, 75 N. C. 186 (1875).
118 Fox v. Brooks, 88 N. C. 234 (1883).
" 'In Whitaker v. Smith, 81 N. C. 340, 341 (1879) the court said: "A very
large proportion of the laboring population of the State has just recently been
released from thraldom and thrown upon their own resources, perfectly ignorant
of the common business transaction of social life, and this provision of the
Constitution and the acts passed to carry it into effect, were intended to give pro-
tection to that class of persons who were totally dependent upon their manual
toil for subsistence. The law was designed exclusively for mechanics andlaborers."
115 Broyhill v. Gaither, 119 N. C. 443, 26 S. E. 31 (1896).
118 Isler v. Dixon, 140 N. C. 529, 53 S. E. 348 (1906).
117 N. C. Gm-. STAT. §44-1 (1943). For discussion generally see Boyd, Some
Phases of Title Examination and Real Estate Practice, 20 N. C. L. REv. 169, 173
(1942).
1-887 N. C. 83 (1882); Cameron v. McDonald, 216 N. C. 712, 6 S. E. 2d
497 (1940).
"I0 Piedmont Memorial Hospital v. Guilford County, 221 N. C. 308, 20 .S. E.
2d 332 (1942) ; Coates, The Battle of Exemptions, 19 N. C. L. Rav. 154 (1941).
1
2 N. C. CONsT. Art. X §2. A widow succeeding to the homestead of her
husband must pay taxes thereon. Tucker v. Tucker, 108 N. C. 235, 13 S. E. 5
(1891), reversed on rehearing because the sale did not comply with statutory
requirements. 110 N. C. 333, 14 S. E. 860 (1892).
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5 of the North Carolina Constitution was amended1 21 to permit the Gen-
eral Assembly to exempt from taxation property "held and used as a
place of residence of the owner" not to exceed $1,000.00 in value. This
provision is merely permissive and not self-executing.1 22 It applies only
to homesteads used as a place of residence.12 The General Assembly
has not exercised its right under this amendment to provide for such
exemption. Conceding that such legislation, if enacted, would encourage
home ownership; yet it would have the undesirable result of diminishing
the revenue of local governmental units.124
(4) Obligations Not Considered as Debts.
Several types of obligations have been construed not to be ordinary
debts within the meaning of the homestead provisions of the constitu-
tion. In Walker v. Walker 2 5 it was ordered, in connection with a decree
for absolute divorce, that the husband should pay a monthly sum for
the support of his minor daughter. When payments were in arrears the
court decreed that the homestead (and personal property exemptions)
should be specifically charged with this obligation. Alimony without
divorce is not a debt within the meaning of the homestead law.12 0  But
where alimony continues after absolute divorce pursuant to G. S.
§50-11127 considerable doubt exists whether the court would deprive the
husband of his exemptions; particularly, after he remarries.1
2
Homestead cannot be claimed where the obligation is for drainage
district assessments'm or costs due from a partition proceeding 1 0 for
these obligations are considered as charges against the land and not
personal debts.
(5) Arrest Against the Person-Debtors Oath.
In Dellinger v. Tweed13 it was held that homestead exemption was
valid against a judgment in tort as well as in contract. Legislative
enactments, however, have had the effect of limiting the scope of this
I"' Last sentence in Art. V §5.
122 Nash v. Comr's of St. Pauls, 211 N. C. 301, 304, 190 S. E. 475, 477 (1937).
12 Compare with Section III "E" supra.
1"' Note, 15 N. C. L. REv. 211 (1937); Reynard, Louisiana Homestead Tax
Exemptio---An Unlitigated Constitutional Provision, 10 LA. L. REV. 405 (1950).
125 204 N. C. 210, 167 S. E. 818 (1933).
' Anderson v. Anderson, 183 N. C. 139, 110 S. E. 863 (1922).
'I". . . a decree of absolute divorce upon the ground of separation for two
successive years as provided in §50-5 or §50-6 shall not impair or destroy the
right of the wife to receive alimony under any judgment or decree of the court
rendered before the commencement of the proceeding for absolute divorce." See
also N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-247 (1949 supp.).
128 Note, 11 A. L. R. 123 (1921).
.2 Middle Canal Company v. Whitley, 172 N. C. 100, 90 S. E. 1 (1916).
.3. Sansom v. Johnson, 212 N. C. 383, 193 S. E. 272 (1937) ; Hinnant v. Wilder,
122 N. C. 149, 29 S. E. 221 (1898). Under N. C. GEN. STAT. §6-21(7) costs in
a partition proceeding may be made against either party or apportioned.
13166 N. C. 206 (1872).
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decision. Arrest against the person is authorized where fraud has been
practiced in connection with a contractual obligation 32 or in certain
torts133 where the injury was inflicted intentionally or maliciously or in
wanton disregard of the plaintiff's'rights. 134 In such cases a prisoner
unable to give bond or pay a judgment may take the oath135 of insolvent
debtor's and be discharged from prison provided he surrenders all prop-
erty whatsoever in excess of fifty dollars. The same is true of prisoners
convicted in a criminal action who are unable to: pay a fine or costs.'3 6
The effect of this procedure is to deprive the defendant of his home-
stead exemption and of personal property exemption above fifty
dollars.lar
(6) Rents and Profits.
In Citizens National Bank v. Green s8 the debtor had his homestead
allotted in property valued at $1,000.00. Subsequently, he purchased
additional land with money derived from the sale of crops grown on the
homestead land. It was held that the judgment creditor was entitled to
go against the additional land even though it was purchased with the
rents and profits from the homestead land. This decision has been
understood to mean that the rents and profits from homestead land
would not inure to the benefit of the debtor beyond his personal property
and homestead exemptions.'3 Justice Bynum predicted in Citizens
National Bank v. Green that cases "will not be frequent where the
excess over the maximum allowance will be so clear and palpable as to
provoke litigation on the part of the creditor. . ."40 His prediction,
aside from the mortgage foreclosure and partition cases discussed
infra,141 appears to have been accurate. Distinguished from the debtor's
rights in this situation is where his widow succeeds to his homestead.
In such case the Constitution specifically provides that the rents and
'12 N. C. CoxsT. Art. I §16: "There shall be no imprisonment for debt in this
State, except in cases of fraud." This provision is confined to causes of action
arising ex contractu. Long v. McLean, 88 N. C. 3 (1883).
1' N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-410 (1943). Justice Clark stated these provisions were
passed in consequence of the decision in Dellinger v. Tweed. State v. Grigg, 104
N. C. 882, 10 S. E. 684 (1889).
1"' Coble v. Medley, 186 N. C. 479, 119 S. E. 892 (1923) ; Oakley v. Lasater,
172 N. C. 96, 89 S. E. 1063 (1916).
I'l N. C. GEN. STAT. §23-23 (1943). For manner in which prisoner discharged
see the Raisin Fertilizer Company v. Grubbs, 114 N. C. 470, 19 S. E. 597 (1894).
'8 N. C. GEN. STAT. §23-24 (1943). The statute formerly permitted such
prisoners to retain their exemptions. State v. Davis, 82 N. C. 610 (1880).
Amendment in 1881 required all but fifty dollars to be surrendered. State v.
Williams, 97 N. C. 414, 2 S. E. 370 (1887).
17 The Raisin Fertilizer Company v. Grubbs, 114 N. C. 470, 19 S. E. 597(1894).18 78 N. C. 247 (1878).
138Tucker v. Tucker, 108 N. C. 235, 13 S. E. 5 (1891).
1,0 Citizens National Bank v. Green, 78 N. C. 247 (1878).
21' See section VIII infra for a discussion and note the result is contrary to
the rule of Citizens National Bank v. Green.
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profits shall inure to her benefit.142 In this respect she enjoys home
stead of her husband more fully than he was permitted to do so.'
43
VI. HOMESTEAD AND DOWER
If a husband dies leaving debts and no children his widow has two
concurrent rights-dower'4 4 and homestead.145 A provision in the Act
of 1886-7146 giving the widow an election between her husband's home-
stead and dower was not included in the Constitution of 1868 and it
does not appear in subsequent legislation. If the husband leaves only
homestead, dower being the lesser interest in this particular land would
be merged in the homestead and there is no problem in determining the
extent of the widow's interest in this situation. She is clearly entitled
to homestead-the greater of the two rights.
147
In McAfee v. Bettis'4 a husband, with the joinder of his wife,
conveyed his homestead during his lifetime and on the husband's death
the court held that the widow was entitled to dower in other land of
which her husband was seized. The homestead acreage was excluded
in computing the extent of her dower interest. The court pointed out
that if the husband died leaving homestead and other land it saw no
objection to the widow's taking the homestead and then dower in the
land outside of the homestead.
If the minor children succeed to their father's homestead, the rela-
tionship between dower and homestead must be considered. Beginning
with Watts v. Leggett"4 in 1872 it has been consistently held'
50 that
homestead of the children must be allotted in the dower land even though
other land is available. The children's enjoyment of homestead is sub-
ject to the dower of their mother. These decisions may have been in-
fluenced by the fact that prior to 1908 it was mandatory that dower be
allotted in the "dwelling house in which her husband usually resided"
and moreover, it was clearly contemplated that where there is a dwelling
it should constitute a part or all of the homestead. But under present
l '5
law it is possible for the jury, at the request of the widow, to allot dower
in land other than the dwelling. Should the dictum of McAfee v.
212 N. C. Coxs= Art. X §5. No such provision is made for minor children
and whether or not they are entitled to rents and profits of their father's home.
stead is uncertain.
148 Tucker v. Tucker, 108, N. C. 235, 13 S. E. 5 (1891).
14 Dower is not subject to payment of huoband's debts. N. C. GEN. STAT.
§30-3 (1943).
x, McAfee v. Bettiq, 72 N. C. 28 (1875).
14, Laws of (1866-67) c. 61 §8.
" Tucker v. Tucker, 103 N. C. 170, 9 S. E. 299 (1889) (homestead greater
than the dower interest).
18 72 N. C. 28 (1875).
14s 66 N. C. 197 (1872).
20 Graves v. Hines, 108 N. C. 262, 13 S. E. 15 (1891) ; Gregory v. Ellis, 86
N. C. 579 (1882) ; Morrisett v. Ferebee, 120 N. C. 6, 8, 26 S. E. 628 (1897).
181 N. C. GEN. STAT. §30-5 (1943).
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Bettis be followed to permit the widow to enjoy both dower and home-
stead where there is sufficient land for an allotment of each in separate
tracts, Watts v. Leggett should be overruled and the widow and children
should have their dower and homestead in different tracts. Otherwise,
a widow with no children would be entitled to dower and homestead
in separate tracts but a widow with minor children would have only
dower; and the homestead of the children would afford little, if any,
additional protection inasmuch as Watts v. Leggett requires that both
rights be asserted in the same land.
VII. CONVEYANCE
A. Joinder of Wife.
Article X section 8 of the Constitution permits the owneri of a home-
stead to dispose of it by deed provided it is signed, and acknowledged
by his wife.152 In Mayho v. Cotton 53 this section was interpreted to
mean that the wife's joinder was required only in a conveyance of an
allotted homestead. Hughes v. Hodges'54 modified this interpretation
by requiring the wife's joinder where the homestead had not been laid
off if there were judgments docketed which might make it necessary to
have the homestead allotted. Although this modification was not fully
accepted in some of the early cases,155 it was accorded full recognition
in Hall v. Dixon 56 where it was stated: "Hughes v. Hodges has been
cited in many cases and acted upon to such an extent that it has prac-
tically become a rule of property." Therefore, it may be stated that
today the wife's joinder is necessary when the homestead has been
allotted or where there is a judgment docketed and in force which con-
stitutes a lien on the land.157 Homestead may be conyeved by the
husband and wife joining with the sheriff in a deed to the purchaser at
an execution sale.'5 8
a2 Privy examination was eliminated by constitutional amendment November
7, 1944.
28s 69 N. C. 289 (1873).
's, 102 N. C. 236, 9 S. E. 437 (1889). This opinion also stated that a con-
veyance of homestead without joinder of his wife after a mortgage had been
executed in which homestead had been reserved was void. It is somewhat analo-
gous to an outstanding judgment because homestead would have to be allotted on
foreclosure.
"'Dixon v. Robbins, 114 N. C. 102, 19 S. E. 239 (1894); Dalrymple v. Cole.
170 N. C. 102, 86 S. E. 988 (1915) ; Id., 181 N. C. 285, 107 S. E. 4 (1921).
158174 N. C.'319, 93 S. E. 837 (1917).
In Cawfield v. Owens, 130 N. C. 641, 41 S. E. 891 (1902) it was held that
a mortgage made by a husband without his wife's joinder was void if there were
judgments outstanding against the husband. Compare with Cleve v. Adams, infra
footnote 169. N. C. GEN. STAT. §30-9 (1943) (Husband cannot convey home-
stead alone even though his wife is insane.). Simmons v. McCullin, 163 N. C.
409, 79 S. E. 625 (1913) (Consent judgment does not require wife's joinder.).
.. North Carolina Joint Stock Land Bank v. Bland, 231 N. C. 26, 56 S. E. 2d
30 (1949).
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The "Homesite" Statute59 enacted in 1919 is not to be confused
with homestead but it has some relationship here because it prohibits
a husband, without the joinder of his wife, from passing title and
possession of the residence during the joint lives of the husband and
wife.18 0 It is not required that the residence be actually occupied by
the owner to come within the purview of this restriction. Purchase
money obligations for the residence are excepted. The "Homesite"
Statute, as construed, has the effect of enabling the wife to interfere
with efforts on the part of her husband to presently pass title to the
"residence" in situations where no homestead has been allotted and
there are no judgments outstanding against him.
B. Effect of Conveyance.
Difficult problems have been encountered in determining the effect
of a conveyance of homestead on the rights of the homesteader, pur-
chaser and judgment creditors. After twice considering the question
in Adrian v. Shaw,'8 ' the court concluded the debtor could still claim
homestead in the conveyed land even though it inured to the benefit of
the purchaser and the judgment creditor could not enforce his lien
against the conveyed land until the homestead of the debtor expired. This
view was reversed in Fleming v. GrahamA6 2 and it was held that a con-
veyance constituted a waiver of homestead. But the next year the rule in
Adrian v. Shaw was restored183 and continued in effect both as to
allotted 8 4 and unallotted' 65 homesteads until 1905. The Act of 190510
provided that a conveyance of an allotted homestead terminated the ex-
emption in the conveyed land, but the debtor was permitted to claim
another homestead in other land he then owned or subsequently acquired.
Although the language of the Act of 1905 referred only to allotted home-
steads, it was construed in Chadbourn Sash, etc. Company v. Parker
0 7
also to apply to unallotted homesteads. As soon as the debtor conveys his
land, the judgment creditor is free to enforce his lien against the con-
veyed land and it is necessary for the judgment creditor to be diligent in
exercising his rights for the statute of limitations 18 is no longer tolled.
Homestead rights are not lost in particular land when a tenant in
common joins in a petition for a sale for partition'6 or when the debtor
"I9 N. C. GEx. STAT. §30-8 (1943).
"'0 Boyd v. Brooks, 197 N. C. 644, 150 S. E. 178 (1929).
18182 N. C. 474 (1880) ; 84 N. C. 832 (1881).
262 110 N. C. 374, 14 S. E. 922 (1892).
... Vanstory v. Thornton, 112 N. C. 196, 17 S. E. 566 (1893).
... Blythe v. Gash, 114 N. C. 659, 19 S. E. 640 (1894)...5 Gardner v. Batts, 114 N. C. 496, 19 S. E. 794 (1894).
... N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-370 (1943).
107 153 N. C. 130, 69 S. E. 1 (1910) (unallotted homestead). Cf. Equitable
Life Assurance Society v. Russos, 210 N. C. 121, 185 S. E. 632 (1936).
1.. Crouch v. Crouch, 160 N. C. 447, 449, 76 S. E. 482 (1912).
... Smith v. Eakes, 212 N. C. 382, 193 S. E. 393 (1937).
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executes a mortgage"70 because these acts do not constitute a conveyance
within the meaning of the Act of 1905.
C. Fraudulent Conveyance.
If a debtor makes a conveyance which is set aside as fraudulent
against creditors, he is not precluded from claiming homestead in the
land fraudulently conveyed.1 7 ' This result is predicated on the reason-
ing that the fraud did not consist in conveying the homestead; for the
creditor could not have reached it by his execution had the debtor re-
tained his homestead.1 72 The fraud was in conveying the other part of
the land. In Marshburn v. Lashlie a73 a limitation was placed on this
rule. The debtor had two tracts of land. Homestead was allotted in
one tract which was alleged to be worth only forty dollars. The debtor
conveyed the other tract in fraud of creditors and when it was set
aside, his request for the balance of his homestead in this tract was
rejected on the theory of an estoppel.
A proviso in section 6 of the Bankruptcy Act is to the effect that
exemptions allowed by state law, ordinarily given to bankrupts under
the Act, will be lost in property which is fraudulently transferred and
which transfer is subsequently avoided for the benefit of the estate.' 74
Whether or not this section will preclude homestead has not yet been
determined but inasmuch as title to the homestead property does not
vest in the trustee 75 it would seem appropriate to adopt the view of the
North Carolina Court that in this situation there is no fraud.
1 76
D. Waiver and Estoppel.
Several early cases'77 took the position that inasmuch as homestead
was conferred by the Constitution it could not be lost by waiver and
estoppel. Subsequent cases have not adhered to this strict view and it
170Cleve v. Adams, 222 N. C. 211, 22 S. E. 2d 437 (1942).
New Amsterdam Casualty Company v. Dunn, 209 N. C. 736, 184 S. E. 488
(1936); Rose v. Bryan, 157 N. C. 173, 7Z S. E. 960 (1911); Crummen v. Ben-
nett, 68 N. C. 494 (1873).172 Crummen v. Bennett, 68 N. C. 494 (1873).
-1- 122 N. C. 237, 29 S. E. 371 (1898).
1'752 STAT. 847 (1938), 11 U. S. C. §24 (1946). An exception is made where
the voided transfer was made by way of security only and the property recov-
ered is in excess of the amount secured thereby. Allowance may be made out of
such excess. This exception was ignored in In re Grisanti, 58 F. Supp. 646
(W. D. Ky. 1945).11730 STAT. 565 (1898), as amended, 11 U. S. C. §110(a) (1946).
17" See generally, Haskins, Homestead Exemptions, 63 HARv. L. Rv. 1289,
1315 (1950).
11TBevan v. Speed, 74 N. C. 544 (1876) (debtor gave note in which he
undertook to waive homestead); Lambert v. Kinnery, 74 N. C. 348 (1878) (no
waiver where debtor told sheriff he did not own land and go ahead and sell it) ;
Littlejohn v. Egerton, 76 N. C. 468 (1877) (no estoppel by parol); Spence v.
Goodwin, 128 N. C. 273, 38 S. E. 859 (1901).
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is now well established in many situations homestead can be waived in
ways other than by a proper conveyance.
In an action to recover land a defendant desiring to assert his home-
stead rights must do so in the answer or else there is a waiver.178
Likewise, a mortgagor in a foreclosure proceeding who desires home-
stead in any surplus is required to make his request in that proceed-
ing.1' 9 If the judgment of the trial court incorrectly states that the
land is to be sold free of homestead, the debtor must appeal from such
judgment or otherwise be bound. 18 Such a judgment is not void but
merely erroneous and must be corrected on appeal. 81 If a husband
and wife advise the sheriff in writing to sell without allotting homestead,
it may be sufficient to constitute a waiver.18
2
E. Waiver of Rights of Infants and Widows.
In an action to sell land to make assets the court in Allen v.
Shieldsns3 indicated that the administrator had the duty of protecting
the homestead interests of the minor defendants even though they were
represented by a guardian ad litem. But in Morrisett v. Ferebee'84 a
request for homestead was made after sale but before confirmation and
the request was denied on the ground that interests of third parties had
intervened; and therefore, homestead rights of the infants had been
waived. A contrary result 8 5 was reached where the request for home-
stead was made before sale-the court stated that the law did not favor
the implied waiver of homestead exemptions, especially by infant
defendants.
Legislation'8 6 now adequately protects the homestead interests of
infants and widows in actions to sell realty to make assets by impos-
ing on the court a duty to appoint three disinterested freeholders to set
1 8 Caudle v. Morris, 160 N. C. 168, 76 S. E. 17 (1912) ; Wilson v. Taylor, 98
N. C. 275, 8 S. E. 492 (1887). Cf. Cawfield v. Morris, 130 N. C. 641, 41 S. E.
891 (1902).1T9Duplin County v. Harrell, 195 N. C. 445, 142 S. E. 481 (1928); Henson
v. Adrian, 92 N. C. 121 (1885). The court said where claim was first made be-
tween sale and confirmation that debtor was not entitled to homestead in metes
and bounds; and indicated he might not have been entitled to any in the surplus
money after sale if the creditors had objected.
280 Cameron v. McDonald, 216 N. C. 712, 6 S. E. 2d 497 (1939). Court
ignored decisions to the effect that a sale under execution without allotment of
homestead is void. See footnote 230 infra. Pence v. Price, 211 N. C. 707, 192
S. E. 99 (1937).
.8 Cameron v. McDonald, 216 N. C. 712, 6 S. E. 2d 497 (1939). Compare
Johnson v. Sink, 217 N. C. 702, 9 S. E. 2d 371 (1940). The court suggested the
latter case might be controlled by Cumming v. Bloodworth, 87 N. C. 83 (1882)
rather than by Cameron v. McDonald.
.8 North Carolina Joint Stock Land Bank v. Bland, 231 N. C. 26, 56 S. E. 2d
30 (1949).
18872 N. C. 504 (1875).
, 120 N. C. 6, 26 S. E. 628 (1897).18 Spence v. Goodwin, 128 N. C. 273, 38 S. E. 859 (1901).11 ON. C. Gm. STAT. §1-389 (1943).
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apart by metes and bounds the homestead of a widow or children. In
Fulp v. Brown87 it was held that a widow was entitled to homestead
in an action to sell land to make assets even though she had failed to
dissent from the will in the time allowed by statute.
VIII. HOMESTEAD AND MORTGAGES
Certain recognized principles are useful in working out the interests
of the parties where there are judgment creditors, mortgagees and a
judgment-debtor-mortgagor. Priority among judgment creditors is to
be determined as they exist at the death of the debtor. 1 A judgment
docketed before registration of a mortgage is the superior lien. 8 9 In
this state a mortgage passes the legal title to the mortgagee, subject to
the equitable principle that the passage of legal title is primarily by
way of security for the debt. For all other purposes, and as against
all persons other than the mortgagee, the mortgagor is regarded as
owner of the land.190 A mortgagor is not entitled to homestead in the
mortgaged land against the interest of tlheymortgagee' 9 ' but he is clearly
entitled to homestead in his equity of redemptiori.19 2  When there is
homestead in the equity of redemption, the morfgage debt is disregarded
for purposes of appraisal and the homestead. is evaluated as if the
debtor owned the land unincumbered by a morgage.193 The fore-
closure of a prior mortgage will terminate homestead in the equity of
redemption.
Problem One.
The debtor executes a mortgage which is registered before judg-
ments are docketed against him. The mortgagee forecloses
before there is execution on the subsequent judgment(s).
In this situation if it appears there is sufficient land outside home-
stead to satisfy the mortgage debt, some indication has been given by
the court that it would, on timely request by the debtor, require the
87 153 N. C. 531, 69 S. E. 612 (1910); N. C. GEN. STAT. §30-3 (1943) pro-
tects dower in the same situation.1 8 Tarboro v. Pender, 153 N. C. 427, 69 S. E. 636 (1910).
Farris v. Hendricks, 196 N. C. 439, 146 S. E. 77 (1928) ; Vanstory v. Thorn-
ton, 112 N. C. 196, 17 S. E. 556 (1893) (overruling Leak v. Gay, 107 N. C. 468,
12 S. E. 251 (1890) insofar as it seemed to decide that a lien of a prior judg-
ment could be displaced by a junior mortgage)."I Cleve v. Adams, 222 N. C. 211, 22 S. E. Zd 567 (1942).
... Miller v. Little, 212 N. C. 612, 194 S. E. 92 (1937); Burton v. Spiers, 87
N. C. 89 (1882) (deed of trust).
Crow v. Morgan, 210 N. C. 153, 185 S. E. 668 (1936) ; Cheek v. Walden,
195 N. C. 752, 143 S. E. 465 (1928); Cheatham v. Jones, 68 N. C. 153 (1873).
... Crow v. Morgan, 210 N. C. 153, 185 S. E. 668 (1936); Virginia-Carolina
Chemical Corporation v. Stuart, 200 N. C. 490, 157 S. E. 608 (1931). If other-
wise, a discharge of the mortgage by payment would leave the homestead em-
bracing too much land and a reallottment would be necessary. Burton v. Spiers,
87 N. C. 87, 93 (1882) ; but see McCaskill v. McKinnon, 125 N. C. 179, 34 S. E.
273 (1899).
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mortgagee to go against the land outside homestead first.194 This is
analogous to the procedure available to a widow for the protection of her
dower where she has joined in a mortgage with her husband and there
is a foreclosure after his death. 19 5 Should the debtor neglect to make
such a request'9 6 or should it be denied, it is appropriate for him to ask
that homestead be allotted in any surplus money (regarded as realty)
after foreclosure. 9 7 Failure to make timely request for homestead in
the surplus will be deemed a waiver.'
9 8
The rights of all the parties appear to be adequately protected should
homestead be allotted by metes and bounds before foreclosure where
there is other land sufficient to satisfy the mortgage debt. Adoption of
this procedure where practicable would eliminate difficulties encountered
in cases where homestead is given in the surplus money after a fore-
closure proceeding.'9
Problem Two.
The debtor executes a mortgage which is registered before judg-
ments are docketed against him. There is a sale under execution
to satisfy the judgment before the mortgage is foreclosed.
The debtor is entitled to have homestead allotted in the equity of
redemption. The judgment creditor (i.e., sheriff) must sell exclusive
of homestead. But what is the relationship between the purchaser at
the execution sale and the homesteader and between both these parties
and the mortgagee? The mortgagee has a lien on the homestead land
as well as that in the hands of the purchaser at the execution sale and
the mortgagee may foreclose on both tracts. The homesteader has no
greater rights in the homestead land in respect to the mortgage than
the purchaser at the execution sale has in respect to the land he pur-
chased at the sale. Therefore, in this situation the homesteader should
not be permitted to require the mortgagee to foreclose on the land in
the bands of the purchaser at the execution sale before selling home-
stead. This principle was fully recognized in Miller v. Little200 where
there was a surplus after the mortgagee had foreclosed on all the land,
i.e., homestead land and land held by the purchaser at the execution
sale. The court held that the surplus of $800.00 must be shared by the
1' Hinson v. Adrian, 92 N. C. 121 (1885); Cheatham v. Jones. 68 N. C. 153
(1873)..9. Holt v. Lynch, 201 N. C. 404, 160 S. E. 469 (1931).
... Miller v. Little, 212 N. C. 612, 615, 194 S. E. 92, 94 (1937). It is doubt-
ful if the court would have granted such a request, if made, under the facts of
the case.
"o Farris v. Hendricks, 196 N. C. 439, 146 S. E. 77 (1928) ; Hinson v. Adrian,
92 N. C. 121 (1885).
"" Duplin County v. Harrell, 195 N. C. 445, 142 S. E. 481 (1928).
.9. See section III "F" supra.
200 212 N. C. 612, 194 S. E. 92 (1937).
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homesteader and the purchaser at the execution sale in accordance with
the value of the land each held at the time of foreclosure.
Problem Three.
Judgment(s) is docketed against the debtor before a mortgage
is registered. There is a sale under execution to satisfy the
judgment before the mortgage is foreclosed.
The debtor is entitled to have his homestead allotted in his equity
of redemption.20 1 But what happens when the mortgagee forecloses?
One possible answer may be found in Vanstory v. Thornton 02 where
the court held that the mortgagee would be entitled to the rents and
profits (i.e., interest on homestead money) for the duration of the
debtor's homestead. This decision may not be sound since the Act of
1905203 terminating homestead upon conveyance. Although it is clear
that the mere execution of a mortgage is not a conveyance within the
meaning of this Act,204 it does not follow that a foreclosure sale under
a mortgage which is inferior to a prior judgment should not be con-
sidered a conveyance. If such sale is treated as a conveyance 5 and
thus terminating homestead, the judgment creditor then would be en-
titled to claim sufficient proceeds from the sale to satisfy his lien
rather than having to wait while an inferior lien holder enjoys the home-
stead of a debtor who has voluntarily parted with his homestead by
executing a mortgage which resulted in a foreclosure sale.
Problem Four.
Judgment(s) is docketed against the debtor before a mortgage
is registered. The mortgagee forecloses before there is execu-
tion on the judgment.
In Farris v. Hendricks206 the parties had an opportunity but failed
to present squarely to the court the question as to whether or not the
foreclosure by a subsequent lien holder constituted a conveyance which
would entitle the prior judgment holder to satisfy his lien free of
homestead. Nevertheless, the court felt compelled to remind the prior
judgment creditor that his lien was superior and that the sum in the
foreclosure sale was sufficient to satisfy the judgment. Due to the
unusual207 facts of the case this statement is susceptible to another
201 Cheek v. Walden, 195 N. C. 752, 143 S. E. 465 (1928).
202 112 N. C. 196, 17 S. E. 566 (1893); same case 114 N. C. 377, 19 S. E. 359
(1894).
" N. C. GEx. STAT. §1-370 (1943).
20' Cleve v. Adams, 222 N. C. 211, 22 S. E. 2d 567 (1942).
0 See discussion in problem four of this section.
208 196 N. C. 439, 146 S. E. 77 (1928).
20 The claim of the judgment creditor was for $208.11 and that of the mort-
gagee $700.00 In the foreclosure sale the land brought $1,296.75. Taking the view
that the debtor relinquished $700.00 of his homestead to the mortgagee by execut-
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interpretation; but it is the nearest the court has come to dealing with
this important question.208  Should it be finally determined that the
Act of 1905 has no application in this situation, the rule of Vanstory
v. Thornton2 °0 would apparently prevail and the mortgagee would enjoy
the homestead of the debtor and the judgment creditor must await the
normal expiration of homestead before enforcing his lien against the
homestead land.
IX. CONCURRENT OWNERSHIP
A. Tenants in Common.
A judgment lien on the undivided interest of a tenant in common is
subordinate to the right of the cotenants to enforce a partition; and
when it is made, the judgment lien is transferred to the portion assigned
to the debtor in severalty210 (or to his share of the-proceeds of sale).
The debtor is entitled to homestead in the land assigned him in severalty
or if there was a sale, he is entitled to the net income of a sum not
exceeding $1,000.00 for the duration of homestead 21' If a tenant in
common initiates the partition proceedings and a sale results, it does
not constitute a waiver of homestead rights.
212
A judgment creditor, who has a lien against either a tenant in com-
mon or a joint tenant, may institute a special proceeding before the
clerk for a partition.213 After the actual partition, the judgment creditor
may proceed to sue out execution and after homestead is allotted the
excess may be sold in satisfaction of the lien. Although there is no
specific statutory provision for a sale where the property cannot be
fairly divided, it seems likely that the clerk will be permitted to exercise
his discretion as in other partition proceedings.
21 4
Ordinarily a tenant in common cannot have his homestead allotted
until his property has been assigned in severalty ;21r but if it is done
without objection of the cotenants the allotment is not void but merely
irregular.21
6
ing the mortgage there is sufficient money to pay the mortgagee his full $700.00
and also pay the full amount of the judgment and there is still $300.00 left for
homestead which under this theory is all the homesteader is entitled to claim.
208 In Duplin County v. Harrell, 195 N. C. 445, 142 S. E. 481 (1928) some
language of the court may be construed as an indication the court might conclude
there is a conveyance but no decision was reached because a waiver was found.
209 112 N. C. 196, 17 S. E. 566 (1893).
0°Edmonds v. Wood, 222 N. C. 118, 22 S. E. 2d 237 (1942). Holly v. White,
172 N. C. 77, 89 S. E. 1061 (1916) states that if the judgment creditors are not
parties, the purchaser buys subject to such liens. On the other hand, Justice
Seawell in Edmonds v. Wood cites with approval a statement that the purchaser
takes title free from the lien whether the judgment creditor is a party or not leav-
ing the judgment creditor to go against the proceeds of the sale.
21 Smith v. Bakes, 212 N. C. 382, 193 S. E. 393 (1937).
212Ibid. "1 2 N. C. GEN. STAT. §46-5 (1943).
"' Taylor v. Carrow, 156 N. C. 6, 72 S. E. 76 (1911).
2. Hinnant v. Wilder, 122 N. C. 149, 152, 29 S. E. 221, 222 (1911)."' Kelly v. McLeod, 165 N. C. 382, 81 S. E. 455 (1914).
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B. Tenancy by the Entirety.
When husband and wife own land as tenants by the entirety, they
are each deemed to be seized of the whole and not of a moiety of an
undivided portion thereof.21 7 During their joint lives a judgment against
either of them severally does not render the land subject to sale under
execution on such judgment.218  On the other hand, where the judg-
ment is upon a joint contract or obligation against husband and wife, a
lien is created on land held by them as tenants by the entirety.219 In
Martin v. Lewis22 0 there was such a judgment and the sheriff laid off
two homesteads. Chief Justice Clark noting this fact made the follow-
ing comment:
"It would seem that if homestead should be allowed, there could
be only one, seeing that in no event could the survivor have more
than one homestead. This exemption should be the husband's
homestead and held on the same terms, i.e., by entireties, for his
life, and if he should not be the longest liver, then for the life
of his wife. We make, however, no decision on this point, for it
would be merely obiter dictum, not being necessary in this
instance."
221
Tenants by the entirety are not entitled to homestead where they have
entered into a joint obligation for the purchase of the premises.2 2 2
X. ALLOTMENT
When homestead is once allotted, the only way the property em-
braced therein may lose its homestead character is by "death, abandon-
ment or alienation." 223 The Constitution does not define the procedure
for the allotment of a homestead. Detailed procedures, however, have
been established by legislation.2 2 4  A resident owner may be allotted
homestead on his own application made to a justice of the peace of the
county in which he resides. It is not essential that the applicant be in-
solvent for the reason that homestead ". . . is not the offspring of and
does not draw its life blood from a judgment debt. ' 2 2  Instead, it is a
right which stems from the Constitution.
11 Winchester-Simmons Company v. Cutler, 199 N. C. 709, 155 S. E. 611
(1930). See generally on tenancy by the entirety, Davis v. Bass, 188 N. C. 200,
124 S. E. 566 (1924) ; Johnson v. Leavitt, 188 N. C. 682, 125 S. E. 490 (1924).
"18 Winchester-Simmons Company v. Cutler, supra note 217; Southern Dis-
tributing Company v. Carraway, 189 N. C. 420, 127 S. E. 427 (1925) ; Johnson v.
Leavitt, 188 N. C. 682, 125 S. E. 490 (1924)."19 Martin v. Lewis, 187 N. C. 473, 122 S. E. 180 (1924).
32 Ibid.
221 Ibid.
"' Johnson v. Leavitt, 188 N. C. 682, 686, 125 S. E. 490, 492 (1924).
... Williams v. Johnson, 230 N. C. 338, 53 S. E. 2d 277 (1949).
"'1 N. C. GEN. STAT. §§1-369 through 1-392 (1943). McINTosH, NORTH CARD-
LINA PRACTICE AND PaocEnuRE 887 (1929). The subjects of allotment, revaluation
and reallotment will not be fully treated here because of the detail provided in
the statutes and the excellent discussion in McINTosH.
2'1 Williams v. Johnson, 230 N. C. 338, 342, 53 S. E. 2d 277, 280 (1949).
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Homestead is frequently allotted by the sheriff and when a sheriff is
seeking to collect a judgment under execution issued to him, he must,
before levying upon the real property of the debtor, proceed to have
the debtor's homestead allotted.226 He is directed by statute to summon
"three discreet persons qualified to act as jurors" to act as appraisers.
227
The purpose of allotment under these circumstances is to ascertain
whether there is any excess property over the homestead on which a
sale can be had.
Whether the allotment is by the sheriff under execution or on petition
of the owner, the owner is entitled to an opportunity to make a selection
of the exact land not exceeding in value the sum of $1,000.00.228 If
the appraisal is on execution and the owner is not given an opportunity
to be present, the appraisal and allotment are void.229  G. S. § 1-372 (as
amended in 1945) requires that a certified copy of the return of the
appraisers be registered in the office of the register of deeds and without
registration the return is void as to third persons not a party to the
proceeding.
A sale under execution without first ascertaining and setting apart
homestead is void2 0 unless waived = 1 by the debtor or unless the sale
was for an obligation superior to homestead.m Ordinarily the debtor
and judgment creditor are bound by the valuaion of the appraisers
unless exceptions are taken thereto in accordance with statutory require-
ments.ms But in Springer v. Colwell 4 the debtor owned land in two
counties and the value of the homestead in the county of the levy did not
amount to $1,000.00. It was held sufficient that the debtor sent a
transcript of the allotment to the clerk and the sheriff of the other county
2 I N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-371 (1943).""Ibid. Same requirement as regular jurors and not those of tales jurors.
Hale Brothers v. Whitehead, 115 N. C. 28, 20 S. E. 166 (1894).
228 This is not necessarily inconsistent with the idea that homestead must be
allotted in the dwelling, if any. The choice could have reference to particular
lind to go with the dwelling where appropriate. Citizens Bank v. Robinson, 201
N. C. 796, 161 S. E. 487 (1931).
2 McKeithan v. Blue, 142 N. C. 360, 55 S. E. 285 (1906). If the owner
makes no selection, the appraisers may make it for him, "including always the
dwelling and buildings used therewith.: N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-376 (1943).
... Fulton v. Roberts, 113 N. C. 421, 18 S. E. 510 (1893); McCracken v.
Adler, 98 N. C. 400, 4 S. E. 138 (1887) ; Mitchell v. Mitchell, 211 N. C. 308, 310,
190 S. E. 487, 488 (1937).
"I1 North Carolina Joint Stock Land Bank v. Bland, 231 N. C. 26, 56 S. E. 2d
30 (1949).2 Miller v. Miller, 89 N. C. 402 (1883). See section V "C" supra.
"8 N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-381 (1943); Whitehead v. Spivey, 103 N. C. 66, 9
S. E. 319 (1889); Spoon v. Reid, 78 N. C. 244 (1878). If exceptions are filed
under G. S. 1-381, the final evaluation is made by the trial jury in accordance
with G. S. 1-382. The purpose of this procedure is to end litigation on the
matter of evaluation. Shoaf v. Frost, 116 N. C. 675, 21 S. E. 409 (1895). (Also
points out if homestead land greatly depreciates in value, the debtor may resort
to equity.)
2- 116 N. C. 520, 21 S. E. 301 (1895).
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with a request to allot sufficient land to make up the full exemption
notwithstanding no exception had been made to the original allotment.
The mortgage foreclosure cases excepted,23 5 the courts have taken
the position that a debtor is entitled to an allotment of a specific and
defined portion of land in severalty236 for homestead. A judgment
creditor was denied the privilege of selling the whole house and allotting
homestead in money from the sale. 237  If the debtor owns a single
dwelling valued at more than homestead and no other property, the
court has suggested that a portion of the house, containing rooms of
sufficient value, be set apart as in the allotment of dower.238
In certain cases where the right of homestead is in issue before the
court, the court itself has appointed commissioners to lay off home-
stead2 and it is under a duty to do so to protect the interests of a widow
or children where there is a sale of realty to make assets.
240
Reallotment for Increase in Value. '
Prior2 41 to the legislation enacted in 1893 if the homestead increased
in value, the sole remedy available to a creditor was to proceed in the
nature of an equitable action to subject the excess to the satisfaction of
his claim. G. S. §1-373 makes provision for a reallotment upon appli-
cation by a judgment creditor accompanied by the affidavits of three
disinterested freeholders of the county setting forth that, in their opin-
ion, the homestead property has increased in value fifty per centum or
more since the last allotment. Upon due notice and hearing as specified
in this statute, the clerk makes his finding and has the authority to
command the sheriff to reallot the homestead in the same manner as if
no homestead had been allotted. If the increase is less than fifty percent
the judgment creditor may still resort to equity.242  It is immaterial
whether the increase in value is due to improvements made by the debtor
or to other factors such as the development of a nearby town.2 4
,'5 Section III "F' .supra.
226 Campbell v. White, 95 N. C. 491 (1886).
2 Oakley v. Van Noppen, 96 N. C. 247, 2 S. E. 663 (1887).
28 Campbell v. White, 95 N. C. 491 (1886).
"' Benton v. Collins, 125 N. C. 83, 34 S. E. 242 (1899) ; Littlejohn v. Egerton,
77 N. C. 379 (1877).
210 N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-389 (1943).
,'Gulley v. Cole, 102 N. C. 333, 9 S. E. 196 (1889).2,N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-373 (1943).
McCaskill v. McKinnon, 125 N. C. 179, 34 S. E. 273 (1899).
